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ERIC LAWDAHL BROWN, JR., ) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) ____________ ) 
NO. 40545 
KOOTENAI COUNTY NO. CR 2011-18678 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case presents the question of whether the Idaho Court of Appeals has the 
authority to review a prior order issued by the Idaho Supreme Court under the limited 
circumstances where the order is subsequently challenged in the appellant's brief. Due 
to the nature of this issue and the repeatability of the problem, Eric Brown asks the 
Idaho Supreme Court to review this case. 
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This case also involves an ongoing dispute about the proper standard of review, 
and the necessity of specific transcripts, in cases where the district court either retains 
jurisdiction or places a defendant on probation. Due to the nature of this issue and the 
repeatability of the problem, Mr. Brown asks the Idaho Supreme Court to grant review. 
In the State v. Brown, 2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 327 (Ct. App. Jan. 15, 
2014) (hereinafter, Opinion), the Idaho Court of Appeals refused to address Mr. Brown's 
argument that he was denied due process and equal protection on appeal when this 
Court denied him access to transcripts of the sentencing hearing held on February 1, 
2012, and the rider review hearing held on June 15, 20121, based on its prior opinion in 
State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618 (Ct. App. 2012). In Morgan, Mr. Morgan filed a motion 
to augment the record on appeal with various transcripts and this Court denied that 
request. Id. at 620. In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Morgan argued that this Court denied 
him due process and equal protection when it denied him access to the requested 
transcripts. Id. The Idaho Court of Appeals was assigned the appeal, and it held that it 
did not have the authority to address this Court's decision to deny Mr. Morgan's request 
for the transcripts. Id. In this case, based on its rationale in Morgan, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals refused to address Mr. Brown's argument that this Court denied him due 
process and equal protection. (Opinion, pp.2-3.) 
Mr. Brown argues that review should be granted to address the ongoing question 
of whether the Idaho Court of Appeals can review an order issued by this Court when 
that order is subsequently challenged in the Appellant's Brief and then the appeal is 
1 In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Brown also challenged this Court's denial of his request for 
the change of plea hearing held on December 8, 2011. (Appellant's Brief, pp.4-18.) In 
light of this Court's Opinion in State v. Brunet, 155 Idaho 724 (2013), Mr. Brown is 
abandoning his claims of error pertaining to the foregoing transcript. 
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assigned to the Idaho Court of Appeals. Mr. Brown argues that this Court's decision to 
assign his appeal to the Idaho Court of Appeals functions as an implicit grant of 
authority to the Idaho Court of Appeals to address the merits of the issue. 
Mr. Brown also argues that review should be granted so this Court can provide 
further clarification as to the current standard of review recently discussed in State v. 
Brunet, 155 Idaho 724 (2013), where this Court held that when a defendant has been 
on probation and challenges his/her sentence on appeal that the entire record 
encompassing events before and after the probation violation are relevant to the 
sentencing issue on appeal. However, at the same time, this Court held that the 
transcripts of intervening sentencing/disposition hearings are not necessary for this 
review unless the defendant provides a colorable need for the transcripts. Mr. Brown 
requests that this Court grant review in order to clarify what constitutes a colorable need 
for such transcripts. 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Brown was charged, by information, with possession of a controlled 
substance, driving under the influence of alcohol (hereinafter, DUI), driving with a 
suspended license, possession of drug paraphernalia, and obstructing a police officer.2 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Brown pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled 
substance, DUI, and attempting to elude,3 and in return, the State dismissed the 
remaining charges. (R., pp.22-23.) Thereafter, the district court imposed a unified 
sentence of four years, with two years fixed, for the possession of a controlled 
2 The Information is currently not in the record of appeal. Accordingly, a motion to 
augment has been filed concurrently herewith. 
3 The obstruction charge was amended to attempting to elude. (R., pp.22-23.) 
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substance conviction and time served on the remaining convictions. (R., pp.33-37.) 
The district court also retained jurisdiction. (R., p.36.) Upon review of Mr. Brown's 
period of retained jurisdiction (hereinafter, rider), the district court suspended the 
sentence and placed Mr. Brown on probation. (R., pp.41-54.) 
After a period of probation, the State filed a report of probation violation and 
addendum alleging that Mr. Brown violated the terms of his probation. (R., p.49; 
Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.47-49, 55-56.)4 Mr. Brown 
admitted to violating the terms of his probation for failing to serve discretionary jail time, 
failing to report to his probation officer on multiple occasions, using marijuana, 
absconding from supervision, carrying a concealed weapon, and possessing 
paraphernalia. (R., pp.49-50; PSI, pp.47-49, 55-56.) The district court revoked 
probation and executed the underlying sentence. (R., pp.51-52.) Mr. Brown timely 
appealed. (R., pp.54-56.) 
On appeal, Mr. Brown filed a motion to augment the record with various 
transcripts. (Motion to Augment, pp.1-4.) The State objected, in part, to Mr. Brown's 
request for the transcripts. (Objection to "Motion to Augment and to Suspend the 
Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof' (hereinafter, Objection to Motion 
to Augment), p.1.) Thereafter, the Idaho Supreme Court entered an order granting 
Mr. Brown's request for a transcript of the admit/deny hearing held on September 19, 
2012, but denying his request for transcripts of the change of plea hearing held on 
December 8, 2011, the sentencing hearing held on February 1, 2012, and the rider 
4 The report of probation violation and the addendum are contained in an electronic file 
which begins with the PSI. For ease of citation, all citations to the documents contained 
in that file will adhere to said file's pagination. 
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review hearing held on June 15, 2012. (Order, (hereinafter, Order Denying Motion to 
Augment), pp.1-2.) 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Brown argued that the Idaho Supreme Court violated 
his constitutional due process and equal protection rights, and his constitutional right to 
effective assistance of counsel, by denying his request for the various transcripts. The 
appeal was thereafter assigned to the Idaho Court of Appeals. Ultimately, the Idaho 
Court of Appeals concluded that it had no authority to determine whether the Idaho 
Supreme Court violated Mr. Brown's constitutional rights when it denied his request for 
the transcripts. (Opinion, pp.2-3.) The Idaho Court of Appeals also affirmed the district 
court's order revoking probation. (Opinion, pp.3-4.) 
Mr. Brown filed a timely Petition for Review. 
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ISSUES 
1. Should this Court accept review to clarify whether the Idaho Court of Appeals has 
the authority to address an order issued by the Idaho Supreme Court in the event 
that order is subsequently challenged in the Appellant's Brief? 
2. Should this Court accept review and clarify the proper scope of review in 
jurisdictional relinquishment/probation revocation appeals, and thereby determine 
the necessity of providing transcripts of prior hearings? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to reduce Mr. Brown's 




This Court Should Accept Review To Clarify Whether The Idaho Court Of Appeals Has 
The Authority To Address An Order Issued By The Idaho Supreme Court In The Event 
That Order Is Subsequently Challenged In The Appellant's Brief 
A. Introduction 
This Court should accept review because Mr. Brown's case presents an issue of 
first impression for the Idaho Supreme Court, as this Court has not issued an opinion 
controlling the question of whether the Idaho Court of Appeals can address the merits of 
an issue raised in an Appellant's Brief that challenges a prior order of this Court.5 
Review is necessary because this is an ongoing issue which involves many cases. 
Mr. Brown wants this Court to hold that the Idaho Appellate Rules required the Idaho 
Court of Appeals to rule on the merits of all the issues raised in Mr. Brown's Appellant's 
Brief. Additionally, he wants this Court to hold that its decision to assign Mr. Brown's 
case to the Idaho Court of Appeals functioned as an implicit grant of authority enabling 
the Idaho Court of Appeals to rule on the merits of all the issues raised. 
In the event this Court concludes that the Idaho Court of Appeals had no 
authority to address the order denying Mr. Brown's request for transcripts, he argues 
that his due process rights, guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution, have been denied because this Court's decision to assign an 
appellate issue to an appellate court with no authority to address that issue is 
fundamentally unfair and deprives him of his statutory right to appeal. 
5 It should be, noted that virtually identical arguments as are set forth in this section of 
the brief were rejected by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Cornelison, 154 Idaho 
793 (Ct. App. 2013). However, Mr. Brown disagrees with the holdings in Cornelison 
and Idaho Court of Appeals' precedent is, of course, not binding on this Court. 
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B. Standard 
The Idaho Appellate Rules provide that petitions for review may be granted only 
"when there are special and important reasons" for doing so, but ultimately, the decision 
of whether to grant a given petition lies within the sound discretion of the Supreme 
Court. I.AR. 118(b ). This exercise of discretion is not completely unfettered though. 
Rule 118(b) provides a non-exhaustive list of five factors which must be considered in 
evaluating any petition for review: 
1) Whether the Court of Appeals has decided an issue of first 
impression; 
2) Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with 
precedent from the Idaho Supreme Court or the United States 
Supreme Court; 
3) Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with its own 
prior decisions; 
4) Whether the Court of Appeals' actions are so unusual as to call for 
the Supreme Court's exercise of its supervisory authority; and 
5) Whether a majority of the Court of Appeals has certified that further 
appellate review is desirable. 
I.AR. 118(b ). 
C. This Court Should Accept Review To Clarify Whether The Idaho Court Of 
Appeals Has The Authority To Address An Order Issued By The Idaho Supreme 
Court In The Event That Order Is Subsequently Challenged In The Appellant's 
Brief 
1. The Idaho Appellate Rules Required The Idaho Court Of Appeals To 
Address The Issues Raised In Mr. Brown's Appeal 
Mr. Brown filed a motion to augment the record on appeal, pursuant to I.AR. 30, 
with transcripts of various hearings. (Motion to Augment, pp.1-4.) In that motion, 
Mr. Brown argued that the requested hearings were relevant to the issues raised on 
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appeal. That motion was denied by this Court. (Order Denying Motion to Augment, 
pp.1-2.) 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Brown argued that the denial of his request for 
transcripts violated the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection 
clauses. (Appellant's Brief, pp.4-18.) The Idaho Supreme Court then assigned 
Mr. Brown's appeal to the Idaho Court of Appeals. 
In its Opinion, the Idaho Court of Appeals refused to address the merits of 
Mr. Brown's due process and equal protection arguments because it disclaimed any 
authority to overrule a decision made by the Idaho Supreme Court. (Opinion, pp.2-3.) 
Contrary to the Idaho Court of Appeals' holding, Idaho Appellate Rule 108 requires it to 
rule on the merits of all cases it is assigned by the Supreme Court. The relevant 
portions of Rule 108 state as follows: 
Cases Reserved to Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals shall hear and 
decide all cases assigned to it by the Supreme Court; provided that the 
Supreme Court will not assign the following cases: 
(1) Proceedings invoking the original jurisdiction of the Idaho 
Supreme Court; 
(2) Appeals from imposition of sentences of capital punishment in 
criminal cases; 
(3) Appeals from the Industrial Commission; 
(4) Appeals from the Public Utilities Commission; 
(5) Review of the recommendatory orders of the Board of 
Commissioners of the Idaho State Bar; 
(6) Review of recommendatory orders of the Judicial Council. 
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I.AR. 108 (emphasis added). Since the issues raised in his Appellant's Brief do not fall 
into any of the foregoing categories, the Idaho Court of Appeals erred when it concluded 
that it did not have the authority to address the issues raised in his Appellant's Brief. 
Further, the Idaho Supreme Court implicitly granted the Idaho Court of Appeals 
the authority to review Mr. Brown's claims about the constitutionality of the merits of the 
Supreme Court's decision to deny his request for the transcripts. Since Mr. Brown's 
due process/equal protection claims were raised in the Appellant's Brief, the Supreme 
Court must have been aware of those claims when it assigned his appeal to the Court of 
Appeals. This position is bolstered by the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court -
specifically, I.R.S.C. 21, which governs the assignment of cases, and provides: 
Assignment of Cases. The chief justice (or designee) shall make the 
tentative assignment of cases as between the Supreme Court and the 
Court of Appeals. Copies of each assignment sheet shall be given to the 
justices, affording each an opportunity to object and request the Court to 
reconsider the assignment. 
Any objection to the assignment shall be stated, with reasons, in writing 
and circulated to all the justices. 
At the request of any justice, the objection to the assignment shall be 
taken up at conference. 
The assignment of cases is not an arbitrary process; according to the Rule, it is a 
deliberate process which affords all the justices the ability to object and provide input 
into the decision to assign a case to the Idaho Court of Appeals. Therefore, the Idaho 
Supreme Court must have been aware of Mr. Brown's due process and equal protection 
arguments when it made the decision to assign this case to the Idaho Court of Appeals. 
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And in doing so, it implicitly granted the Idaho Court of Appeals the authority to address 
the merits of his claims of error. 
Additionally, the Idaho Court of Appeals stated that it may addressed 
Mr. Brown's due process and equal protection arguments had he filed a renewed 
motion to augment directly with it. (Opinion, pp.2-3.) However, this position is 
untenable because the Idaho Appellate Rule 30 requires that all motions to augment be 
filed with the Supreme Court. The relevant portions of I.AR. 30 provide: 
Any party may move the Supreme Court to augment or delete from the 
settled reporter's transcript or clerk's or agency's record. 
Unless otherwise expressly ordered by the Supreme Court such motion 
shall be determined without oral argument. The reporter's transcript and 
clerk's or agency's record may also be augmented or portions deleted by 
stipulation of the parties and order of the Supreme Court. 
I.AR. 30 (emphasis added). Mr. Brown is not aware of any court rule which allows a 
party to an appeal to file a motion to augment the record directly with it. Idaho Appellate 
Rule 30 does not allow a motion to augment to be filed directly with the Idaho Court of 
Appeals. Therefore, the Idaho Court of Appeals' contention that Mr. Brown could have 
filed a renewed motion to augment directly with it is contrary to the Idaho Appellate 
Rules. 
In sum, when the Idaho Supreme Court assigns an appeal to the Idaho Court of 
Appeals, the Idaho Appellate Rules require it to decide all issues addressed in that 
appeal. Even though Mr. Brown is challenging the constitutionality of the Supreme 
Court's decision to deny his requests for the transcripts, the Idaho Supreme Court 
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implicitly authorized the Idaho Court of Appeals to review its decision when it made the 
case assignment. 
2. To The Extent That The Idaho Supreme Court Assigned Mr. Brown's 
Appeal To An Appellate Tribunal With No Authority To Address His Claims 
Of Error, It Violated His Right To Procedural Due Process On Appeal 
In the event this Court holds the Idaho Court of Appeals had no authority to 
address all of the issues Mr. Brown raised in his Appellant's Brief, he argues, in the 
alternative, that decision violated his federal due process rights, which guarantee him a 
fair appeal. The Constitutions of both the United States and the State of Idaho 
guarantee a criminal defendant due process of law. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; lo. 
CONST. art. I§ 13. 
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); 
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts 
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due 
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair." 
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Serv. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24 
(1981). 
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood, 
132 Idaho 88 (1998)). Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United 
States Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United 
States Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh v. State, 132 
Idaho 221, 227 (1998) (citing Smith v. Idaho Dept. of Correction, 128 Idaho 768, 771 
(1996)). 
While there is no federal constitutional guarantee to an appeal from criminal state 
court proceedings, once a state chooses to provide appellate review, the due process 
12 
and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment are applicable during the 
entirety of the appellate proceedings. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956). In 
Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is stationary. See I.C. § 19-2801. An 
appeal from an order revoking probation is an appeal of right as defined in Idaho 
Appellate Rule 11. An order revoking probation is an order "made after judgment 
affecting the substantial rights of the defendant." State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852 
(Ct. App. 1983). Additionally, an appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion is an 
appeal of right as defined in Idaho Appellate Rule 11 (c)(9). See State v. Fuller, 104 
Idaho 891 (Ct. App. 1983) (an order denying a motion for reduction of sentence under 
Rule 35 is an appealable order pursuant to then I.A.R. 11 (c)(6)). 
In this case, Mr. Brown argues that due process protections apply to every stage 
of his appeal. Those protections apply to any procedural decisions made by the Idaho 
Supreme Court. Thus, even if Mr. Brown does not have an independent right to appeal 
from the order denying his motion to augment, he can challenge the constitutionality of 
the order because it is a procedural component of his appeal and the Fourteenth 
Amendment's due process clause applies to all procedures affecting his appeal. When 
the Idaho Supreme Court assigned this appeal to the Idaho Court of Appeals, knowing 
that the Idaho Court of Appeals had no authority to reverse an order of the Idaho 
Supreme Court, a unique and independent procedural due process violation occurred 
because this Court precluded Mr. Brown from enjoying any state procedure whereby he 
could raise his federal constitutional claims challenging the denial of his Motion to 
Augment. As such, the Idaho Supreme Court violated the Fourteenth Amendment's 
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due process clause when it assigned this appeal to an inferior tribunal with no authority 
to address Mr. Brown's claims of error. 
11. 
This Court Should Accept Review And Clarify The Proper Scope Of Review In 
Jurisdictional Relinquishment/Probation Revocation Appeals, And Thereby, Determine 
The Necessity Of Providing Transcripts Of Prior Proceedings 
A. Introduction 
Review should be granted to provide further clarification of an ongoing dispute 
over the proper standard of review in jurisdictional relinquishment/probation revocation 
cases and the applicable appellate record needed for proper review. Ultimately, 
Mr. Brown seeks to have this Court clarify exactly what information needs to be included 
in the record on appeal as it appears that this Court has recently adopted a scope of 
review which is not consistent with its precedent, which requires an appellate court to 
conduct an independent review of the entire record available to the trial court when 
determining whether the trial court abused its sentencing discretion. 
B. Standard 
The applicable standard governing petitions for review was articulated in Section 
l(B), supra, and is incorporated herein. 
C. Mr. Brown's Petition For Review Should Be Granted And This Court Should 
Clarify The Scope Of Review For Evaluating The Reasonableness Of A 
Sentence Which Is Executed After Either A Period Of Probation Or A Period Of 
Retained Jurisdiction 
The requested transcripts are necessary for review of the issue raised in this 
appeal because they are within an Idaho appellate court's scope of review. "In 
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examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent 
review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing .... " State v. 
Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (201 O); see also State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28 (Ct. App. 
2009). 
This Court recently issued an opinion in State v. Brunet, 155 Idaho 724 (2013), 
which addressed the scope of review of an appeal filed from an order revoking 
probation, wherein the appellant argued that his sentence was excessively harsh. In 
that case, this Court determined that the defendant had not demonstrated a colorable 
need for the requested transcripts, and so, there was no violation of the defendant's 
rights by denying him copies of the requested transcripts. Id. at 727. However, the 
Court did not change any of the pre-existing standards governing what transcripts are 
necessary for appellate review. See generally id. In fact, it reaffirmed the standard 
discussed in Pierce - that where the length of the sentence is at issue, the appellate 
court will conduct an independent review of the entire record available to the district 
court. Id. At best, the Brunet Opinion provides no guidance for determining whether 
requested transcripts are necessary to address the merits of sentencing related issues. 
At worst, Brunet contravenes United States Supreme Court authority and the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court characterized Brunet's request for 
transcripts of prior proceedings as a mere "fishing expedition" at taxpayer expense 
because Brunet could not identify a specific need for the transcripts prior to the creation 
of the transcripts. Id. The fact that Brunet could not establish, prior to production of the 
requested transcripts, the contents of those transcripts, or exactly how those contents 
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would have impacted the claim(s) raised in that appeal, does not mean that Mr. Brown, 
who is situated substantially similarly to Brunet, cannot establish a colorable need for 
the transcripts. As Justice Goldberg has explained, it is appellate counsel's job to 
search the record for viable appellate issues: 
As any effective appellate advocate will attest, the most basic and 
fundamental tool of his profession is the complete trial transcript, through 
which his trained fingers may leaf and his trained eyes may roam in 
search of an error, a lead to an error, or even a basis upon which to urge a 
change in an established and hitherto accepted principle of law. Anything 
short of a complete transcript is incompatible with effective appellate 
advocacy. 
Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 288 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (footnote 
and citation omitted).6 Clearly then, appellate counsel cannot know the evidence and 
the claims to be raised on appeal before reviewing the record in a given case. This is 
especially true where Mr. Brown is acting through appellate attorneys who did not 
represent him below. See id. ("The opinion of the Court agrees with this conclusion as it 
relates to 'one whose lawyer on appeal enters the case after the trial is ended.' I 
believe that it is equally applicable to one whose appointed lawyer on appeal was also 
his lawyer at trial.") Since the Idaho Legislature chose to create the State Appellate 
Public Defender's Office to represent indigent defendants on appeal only, meaning the 
vast majority of felony appeals are handled by attorneys with no first-hand knowledge of 
6 In Hardy, the Supreme Court evaluated a federal statute and, therefore, did not "reach 
a consideration of constitutional requirements." Hardy, 375 U.S. at 282. Nevertheless, 
it is notable that in that case, the Supreme Court made it clear that, especially in 
instances where the indigent defendant is provided new counsel for purposes of appeal, 
his counsel cannot do his job without a full transcript. See id. Further, Justice 
Goldberg, who was joined by Chief Justice Warren, and Justices Brennan and Stewart, 
wrote separately to argue that the Court should have gone further: "[l]n the interests of 
justice this Court should require, under our supervisory power, that full transcripts be 
provided, without limitation, in all federal criminal cases to defendants who cannot afford 
to purchase them, whenever they seek to prosecute an appeal." Id. (Goldberg, J., 
concurring). 
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the proceedings below, see I § 19-870, it would be particularly unreasonable to 
require the defendant to show what the specific evidence in the record is, and how that 
specific evidence will impact the claims to be raised on appeal, before he is entitled to 
an adequate appellate record. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals recently issued an opinion in State v. Morgan, 153 
Idaho 618 (Ct. App. 2012), which attempted to address the scope of review of an appeal 
filed from an order revoking probation and clarify the circumstances under which 
transcripts of prior proceedings will be necessary for it to address the merits of appellate 
claims. In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty and was placed on probation. Id. at 
619. After a period of probation, the defendant admitted to violating the terms of his 
probation and the district court revoked probation, but retained jurisdiction. Id. at 619-
620. The defendant subsequently admitted to violating the terms of his probation and 
the district court revoked probation. Id. The defendant appealed from the district 
court's second order revoking probation. Id. 
On appeal, the defendant filed a motion to augment the appellate record with 
transcripts associated with his first probation violation and disposition, which was denied 
by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. The defendant then raised as issues on appeal the 
questions of whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and equal 
protection when it denied the motion to augment and whether the district court abused 
its discretion when it revoked probation. Id. at 620-21. The Idaho Court of Appeals held 
that the transcripts of the prior probation proceedings were not necessary for the appeal 
because "they were not before the district court in the second probation violation 
proceedings, and the district court gave no indication that it based its revocation 
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decision upon anything that occurred during those proceedings." Id. at 621. The Idaho 
Court of Appeals then clarified the scope of review for a revocation determination. 
Specifically, it held: 
[l]n reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, we will not arbitrarily 
confine ourselves to only those facts which arise after sentencing to the 
time of the revocation of probation. However, that does not mean that al/ 
proceedings in the trial court up to and including sentencing are germane. 
The focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision 
to revoke probation. Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the 
record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues 
which are properly made part of the record on appeal. 
Id. (original emphasis) (citation omitted). This case has provided no more guidance 
than Brunet because it also holds that all information known to the district court is 
relevant, but it fails to provide any explanation of the circumstances under which 
transcripts of the prior proceedings will be necessary to address sentencing issues on 
appeal. 
Additionally, the instant case is distinguishable because Morgan only addressed 
the order revoking probation, and here Mr. Brown is challenging the length of his 
sentence, which entails an analysis of "the entire record encompassing events before 
and after the original judgment. We base our review upon the facts existing when the 
sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and 
the revocation of probation." Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28. Furthermore, whether the 
transcripts of the requested proceedings were before the district court at the time of the 
probation revocation hearing is not germane to the question of whether the transcripts 
are relevant to the issues on appeal because, in reaching a sentencing decision, a 
district court is not limited to considering only that information offered at the hearing 
from which the appeal was filed. Rather, the district court is entitled to utilize knowledge 
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gained from its own official position and observations. See Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 
367, 373-74 (Ct. App. 2001); see also State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983) 
(recognizing that the findings of the trial judge in sentencing are based, in part, upon 
what the court heard during trial); State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318 (1977) (recognizing 
that the court could rely upon "the number of certain types of criminal transactions that 
[the judge] has observed in the courts within its judicial district and the quantity of drugs 
therein involved"); State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 1984) (approving 
sentencing court's reliance upon evidence presented at the preliminary hearing from a 
previously dismissed case because "the judge hardly could be expected to disregard 
what he already knew about Gibson from the other case"). Thus, whether the prior 
hearings were transcribed or not is irrelevant, because the court may rely upon the 
information it already knows from presiding over the prior hearings when it made the 
sentencing decision after revoking probation. 
The rationale behind this position comports with the Idaho Court of Appeals' 
reasoning in State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053 (Ct. App. 1989), in which it explained why 
the appellate courts should look to the entire record when reviewing the executed 
sentence: 
[W]hen we review a sentence ordered into execution after probation has 
been revoked, we examine the entire record encompassing events before 
and after the original judgment. We adopt this scope of review for two 
reasons. First, the district judge, when deciding whether to order execution 
of the original sentence or of a reduced sentence, does not artificially 
segregate the facts into prejudgment and postjudgment categories. The 
judge naturally and quite properly remembers the entire course of events 
and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision. When reviewing 
that decision, we should consider the same facts. Second, when a 
sentence is suspended and probation is granted, the defendant has scant 
reason, and no incentive, to appeal. Only if the probation is later revoked, 
and the sentence is ordered into execution, does the issue of an 
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excessive sentence become genuinely meaningful. Were we to adopt the 
state's position that any claim of excessiveness is waived if not made on 
immediate appeal from the judgment pronouncing but suspending a 
sentence, defendants would be forced to file preventive appeals as a 
hedge against the risk that probation someday might be revoked. We see 
no reason to compel this hollow exercise. Neither do we wish to see the 
appellate system cluttered with such cases. 
Adams, 115 Idaho at 1055-56. 
As such, when an appellant files an appeal from a sentence ordered into 
execution after the revocation of probation, the applicable standard of review requires 
an independent and comprehensive inquiry into the events which occurred prior to, as 
well as the events which occurred during, the probation revocation proceedings. The 
basis for this standard of review is that the district court "naturally and quite properly 
remembers the entire course of events and considers all relevant facts in reaching a 
decision." Id. It follows that, "[w]hen reviewing that decision, [an appellate court] should 
consider the same facts." Id. The Idaho Court of Appeals did not hold that the district 
court must expressly reference prior proceedings at the probation disposition hearing in 
order for this scope of review to become applicable. To the contrary, it presumed the 
judge would automatically consider prejudgment events when determining what 
sentence should be executed upon revoking probation. This is consistent with Idaho 
Supreme Court precedent. See Sivak, 105 Idaho at 907. Although the Brunet Court 
could have altered this standard, it did not do so. 
Since the requested transcripts are within the applicable scope of review, the 
Idaho Supreme Court's decision to deny Mr. Brown access to those transcripts 
constitutes a due process and equal protection violation. In Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 
477 (1963), a transcript was necessary to perfect an appeal and the appeal could be 
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dismissed without the transcript. Lane, 327 U.S. at 478-81. Similarly, in Idaho, an 
appellant must provide an adequate record or face procedural default. "It is well 
established that an appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon 
which the appellate court can review the merits of the claims of error, . . . . and where 
pertinent portions of the record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the 
actions of the trial court." State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999); see also 
State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105 (Ct. App. 1991 ); State v. Murinko, 108 Idaho 872, 
873 (Ct. App. 1985). If the transcripts are missing, but the record contains court 
minutes which are sufficient to allow a meaningful review of an appellant's claim, then 
the transcripts are not necessary for review even though the Idaho Court of Appeals has 
"strongly suggest[ed] that appellate counsel not rely on the district court minutes to 
provide ... [a] record for [that] Court's review." State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 491 
(Ct. App. 1999). If Mr. Brown fails to provide the appellate court with transcripts 
necessary for review of his claim, the legal presumption will apply and Mr. Brown's 
sentencing claims will not be addressed on their actual merits. If it is state action, 
combined with Mr. Brown's indigency, that prevents him from access to the necessary 
transcripts, then such action is a violation of the equal protection and due process 
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and any such presumption should no longer 
apply. 
Moreover, and in light of the denial of the transcripts, the foregoing presumption 
should be reversed in this case, and what occurred at those hearings should be 
presumed to discredit the district court's final sentencing decision. When Mr. Brown 
was first given the opportunity for probation, the district court must have found that the 
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circumstances were right to give him an opportunity to be a member of society. To 
ignore the positive factors that were present at the previous hearings presents a 
negative, one-sided view of Mr. Brown. Denial of access to the requested transcripts 
has prevented Mr. Brown from including those positive factors in support of his 
appellate sentencing claims. In light of that denial, Mr. Brown argues that the events 
which occurred at the subject hearings should be presumed to invalidate the district 
court's final sentencing decisions in this matter. 
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both 
due process and equal protection to deny an indigent defendant transcripts necessary 
for a merits-based review on appeal. In this case, the requested transcripts are 
necessary to address the issues on appeal because the applicable standard of review 
of an appellate sentencing claim requires the appellate court to conduct an independent 
review of all of the proceedings before the district court. Under this standard of review, 
the focus is not entirely on the district court's express sentencing rationale7; to the 
contrary, the question on appeal is whether the record itself supports the district court's 
ultimate sentencing decision. 
7 Both the United States Supreme Court and the Idaho Supreme Court have 
consistently held that due process requires trial courts to expressly articulate, on the 
record, their rationale for revoking probation in order to facilitate an effective merits 
based review of those decisions. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); see also 
State v. Chapman, 111 Idaho 152 (1986), supra. 
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D. This Court Should Also Accept Review Because, Assuming The Proper Scope Of 
Review Is An Independent Review Of The Entire Record, The Denial Of 
Mr. Brown's Motion To Augment Is Contrary To United States Supreme Court 
And Idaho Supreme Court Precedent 
Both the state and federal constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant due 
process and equal protection of law.8 U.S. CONST. amend XIV; lo. CONST. art. I § 13. 
These rights are applicable throughout all of Mr. Brown's appellate proceedings. 
The United States Supreme Court has issued several rulings regarding when 
transcripts of prior proceedings must be provided to an indigent defendant. See, e.g., 
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); 
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971 ). The Idaho appellate courts recognize 
the holdings of these cases. See, e.g., Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v. 
Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App. 
2007). These cases stand for the principle that disparate treatment will not be tolerated 
under the broadly-interpreted due process and equal protection clauses. See, e.g., 
Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18. They also define the standard governing the decision to order 
transcript production, which weighs in the defendant's favor. See Mayer, 404 U.S. at 
195. 
Specifically, the procedures that are available to uphold this standard are 
governed by statute in Idaho. I.C. § 1-1105(2); I.C. § 19-863(a); see also I.C.R. 5.2(a) 
("[T]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding before the court .... "); 
I.C.R. 54. ?(a) (the district court is authorized to "order a transcript to be prepared at 
county expense if the appellant is exempt from paying such a fee as provided by statute 
or law"). In order to meet that standard, the defendant need only make a colorable 
8 For a further explanation of these rights see section l(C)(2), supra. 
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argument of need to create the complete appellate record. Mayer, 404 U.S. at 195. 
After the defendant makes such an argument, it is the State's burden to prove that the 
requested items are not necessary to the appeal. Id. 
Mr. Brown made the colorable request in his initial Motion to Augment, and in the 
initial Appellant's Brief considered by the Idaho Court of Appeals. Both the motion and 
the Appellant's Brief are incorporated herein by reference thereto. The Motion to 
Augment requested the preparation of various transcripts. (Motion to Augment, pp.1-3.) 
On appeal, Mr. Brown challenged the sentence the district court imposed and executed 
after revoking probation. (Appellant's Brief, pp.18-21.) Mr. Brown argued that, under 
the applicable Hanington standard, the entire record needed to be reviewed to 
determine whether the district court executed an excessively harsh sentence. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.4-16.) 
Additionally, as this Court has recognized in State v. Chapman, 111 Idaho 149 
(1986), in probation revocation proceedings, "the law recognizes that the previous 
character, good or bad, of one convicted should be considered in fixing the 
punishment." Chapman, 111 Idaho at 154 (emphasis in the original). "[Tihe trial court 
'necessarily must be permitted to evaluate a broad range of information about the 
defendant . . . . Very little information about a defendant will be irrelevant to the effort of 
the law to individualize treatment of convicted persons."' Id. at 153 (emphasis in 
original). In ignoring the prior proceedings, the district court is unable to conduct the 
proper sentencing of a person upon revoking probation. Id. 
Although the State objected to augmentation with the transcripts, it is difficult to 
imagine how it can argue that the information in the prior proceedings is irrelevant in 
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light of the correct standard of review. The State argued that prior proceedings are not 
relevant and that the district court did not expressly rely on the events which occurred in 
those proceedings when it revoked probation. (Respondent's Brief, pp.5-8.) Contrary 
to the State's position, the question of whether the district court expressly relied on 
those proceedings or whether the transcripts of the requested proceedings were before 
the district court at the time of the probation violation disposition hearing is not relevant 
in deciding whether the transcripts are relevant to the issues on appeal. That is 
because, in reaching a sentencing or probation decision, a district court is not limited to 
considering only that information offered at the proceeding from which the appeal is 
filed. Rather, a court is entitled to utilize knowledge gained from its own official position 
and observations. Downing, 136 Idaho at 373-74; see also Sivak, 105 Idaho at 907 
(recognizing that the findings of the trial judge in sentencing are based, in part, upon 
what the court heard during the trial); Wallace, (recognizing that the court could rely 
upon "the number of certain types of criminal transactions that [the judge] has observed 
in the courts within his judicial district and the quantity of drugs therein involved"); 
Gibson, (approving sentencing court's reliance upon evidence presented at the 
preliminary hearing from a previously dismissed case because "the judge hardly could 
be expected to disregard what he already knew about Gibson from the other case"). 
The only mechanism that Idaho has, at this point, to review the information that was 
before the district court is to have the hearings transcribed. I.AR. 27. What was 
argued before the district court in prior proceedings is necessary and relevant to 
determine what has changed so drastically that a person who was deemed safe to be 
placed into society and given a chance at probation must now be incarcerated. Thus, 
25 
whether the prior hearing was transcribed or whether the district court expressly relied 
on those proceedings is irrelevant, because the district court could rely upon the 
information it already knew from presiding over Mr. Brown's prior hearings when it made 
its final probation/sentencing determinations and it is presumed that the district court did 
rely on those proceedings. Adams, 115 Idaho at 1055-56. 
Additionally, the State's position is unworkable because all transcripts, except a 
transcript of the hearing from which an appeal is taken, would be deemed new 
information. This is inconsistent with the holding from State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 
276 (Ct. App. 2000), where the district court examined the defendant about his guilty 
plea during the change of plea hearing. Since the defendant in Burdett failed to provide 
a transcript of that hearing on appeal, the Court of Appeals presumed that something 
occurred in that hearing which supported the district court's sentencing decision. Id. 
If the State's argument is taken to its logical conclusion, a transcript of a 
defendant's original sentencing hearing would be new information in instances where an 
appeal is filed from a Rule 35 motion requesting leniency. Further, if that is new 
information, a district court should not, absent a transcript, consider what happened at 
sentencing when evaluating a Rule 35 motion. However, in State v. Wright, 114 Idaho 
451, 452-453 (Ct. App. 1988), the Idaho Court of Appeals refused to address the merits 
of an appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion because the appellant failed to provide 
the Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI) and a transcript of the 
sentencing hearing. See also State v. Rundle, 107 Idaho 936 (Ct. App. 1984). 
The State's argument is also refuted by State v. Warren, 123 Idaho 20 (Ct. App. 
1992). In that case, Mr. Warren was convicted of aggravated battery and placed on 
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probation. Id. at 21. Mr. Warren's probation was then revoked and the district court 
retained jurisdiction for 180 days. Id. After completing the period of retained 
jurisdiction, Mr. Warren was placed on probation. Id. Mr. Warren's probation was then 
revoked. Id. Mr. Warren then appealed and alleged that his sentence was excessive. 
Id. On appeal, Mr. Warren argued that his probation violation was trivial. Id. The Idaho 
Court of Appeals addressed that argument stating "Warren incorrectly points to the 
nature of the probation violation by arguing that his violation was trivial. This Court must 
look at the nature of the original criminal offense, in this case aggravated battery where 
Warren bit off his victim's ear." Id. (emphasis added). However, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals did not address the merits of his sentencing claims because he failed to 
provide a copy of the original PSI and a transcript of the original sentencing hearing. Id. 
Even though the district court's original sentence was not directly being appealed, and 
happened years before the decision at issue, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that the 
transcript was necessary to address Mr. Warren's claims of error. Moreover, there was 
no indication that the district court referenced the original sentencing hearing at the 
probation violation disposition hearing. It appears that the Idaho Court of Appeals 
presumed that the original sentencing hearing would address the nature of the original 
offense. In light of the Idaho Court of Appeals' holding in Warren, had Mr. Brown failed 
to request the transcripts, the State could have argued that the Idaho Court of Appeals 
should not have addressed the merits of his sentencing claim because he failed to 
provide an adequate appellate record. 
Finally, the State's position will render appellate review on various sentencing 
issues meaningless because district courts in Idaho are not required to state their 
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sentencing rationale. State v. Nield, 106 Idaho 665, 666 (1984 ). If the State's argument 
is accepted, an appellate court would not be able to review a sentence determination in 
the event a district court does not state its sentencing rationale on the record because 
an appellate court reviewing that sentencing decision would not know what information 
the district court considered. The State's position is at odds with a system which 
purports to provide meaningful sentencing review. 
This Court Should Accept Review Because The Morgan Opinion Conflicts With 
United States Supreme Court And Idaho Supreme Court Precedent Requiring 
Effective Assistance Of Counsel And Decides An Issue Of First Impression That 
Has Not Been Addressed By This Court 
The Court of Appeals held in Morgan that Mr. Morgan failed to demonstrate how 
effective assistance of counsel was not possible without the requested transcripts. 
Morgan, 153 Idaho at 622. Mr. Brown submits that the Court of Appeals' decision is in 
conflict with United States Supreme Court and Idaho Supreme Court case law. 
In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
in the context of death penalty cases was selectively incorporated and made applicable 
to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution. In coming to this conclusion, the United States Supreme 
Court reasoned that the ability to be heard by counsel is so inextricably related to due 
process that the denial of counsel is tantamount to the denial of a hearing. Powell, 287 
U.S. at 69. The Supreme Court also held that, under the facts of Powell, 
the necessity of counsel was so vital and imperative that the failure to 
make an effective appointment of counsel was likewise a denial of due 
process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment ... [to] hold 
otherwise would be to ignore the fundamental postulate, already adverted 
to, that there are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the 
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very idea of free government which no member of the Union may 
disregard.' 
Id. at 71-72. 
In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the United States Supreme Court, 
relying on Griffin, supra, and its progeny, determined that the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendants with 
counsel on appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the protection of Douglas 
was extended to the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal. According to the 
United State Supreme Court, "the promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a 
right to counsel on appeal - like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant has a 
right to counsel at trial would be a futile gesture unless it comprehended the right to 
effective assistance of counsel." Id. at 397. 
The remaining issue is defining effective assistance of counsel. According to the 
United States Supreme Court, appellate counsel must make a conscientious 
examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made. In 
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), the United States Supreme Court held 
that the constitutional requirements of substantial equality and fair process "can only be 
attained where counsel acts as an active advocate on behalf of his client . . . . 
[Counsel's] role as advocate requires that he support his client's appeal to the best of 
his ability." See also Banuelos v. State, 127 Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995). 
Furthermore, in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989) (overruled on 
other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991 )), this Court held that the starting 
point of evaluating whether counsel renders effective assistance of counsel in a criminal 
action is the standards identified by the American Bar Association. These standards 
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offer insight into the role and responsibilities of appellate counsel. See American Bar 
Association, Standards For Criminal Justice, The Defense Function. Regarding 
appellate counsel, the standards state: 
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional 
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel, 
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect 
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence. . . . Counsel 
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or 
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a 
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance. 
Standard 4-8.3(b ). In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, and thus a 
complete record, appellate counsel cannot make a professional evaluation of the 
questions that might be presented on appeal, nor can appellate counsel consider all 
issues that might affect the district court's final probation/sentencing decisions. Counsel 
is also unable to advise Mr. Brown on the probable role the transcripts may play in the 
appeal. 
This advice is important to evaluate arguments on appeal because, as argued in 
the above sections, the lack of access to the requested transcripts has prevented 
appellate counsel from making a complete appellate record to include the necessary 
transcripts for review. The proper standard of both appellate review and the district 
court's analysis is not reviewed in a vacuum, but instead, must be based upon the entire 
record. When Mr. Brown was first placed on probation, the district court must have 
found that the circumstances were right to give him the opportunity to be a member of 
society. To ignore the positive factors that were present at the previous hearings 
presents a negative, one-sided view of Mr. Brown. Unless the Court wishes to change 
the presumption of the prior proceedings, the transcripts are necessary to conduct an 
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accurate review and assessment of the individual sentence the appellate court is 
seeking to review. 
Mr. Brown is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and 
effective assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to all of the relevant 
transcripts. Therefore, Mr. Brown has been denied his constitutional right to due 
process which includes a right to the effective assistance of counsel in this appeal. 
111. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Reduce Mr. Brown's 
Sentence Sua Sponte Upon Revoking Probation 
Mr. Brown asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of four 
years, with two years fixed, is excessive. Due to the district court's power under 
I.C.R. 35 to reduce the length of the original sentence sua sponte upon the revocation 
of probation, an appellant can challenge the length of the sentence executed as 
excessive. State v. Jensen, 138 Idaho 941, 944 (Ct. App. 2003). Where a defendant 
contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the 
appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to 
the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public 
interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "'[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Brown does not allege that 
his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse 
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of discretion, Mr. Brown must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence 
was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or 
objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the 
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) 
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. 
There are various mitigating factors which support the conclusion that 
Mr. Brown's sentence is excessively harsh. Specifically, Mr. Brown's age is a mitigating 
factor, as he was only twenty years old when the district court revoked probation and 
nineteen years old when he committed the underlying offense. (PSI, pp.1-2; R., p.50.) 
Mr. Brown's abusive childhood coupled with a lack of supervision during his 
teenage years are mitigating factors. Mr. Brown was raised with a physically abusive 
father who left him and his mother after she was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis. 
(PSI, pp.5-6.) There were times Mr. Brown did not attend school because he didn't 
want people to see the bruises which were the result of his father's abuse. (PSI, p.6.) 
A substance abuse evaluation indicated that Mr. Brown scored in the high range on a 
lifetime victimization scale. (PSI, p.33.) Mr. Brown eventually moved back in with his 
father. (PSI, p.5.) However, their relationship quickly deteriorated and his father moved 
to Oregon with a girlfriend, leaving Mr. Brown to fend for himself when he was only 
sixteen years old. (PSI, p.5.) 
Mr. Brown's mental health problems and substance abuse are mitigating factors. 
Mr. Brown was diagnosed with ADHD and depression when he was thirteen years old. 
(PSI, p.7.) Mr. Brown participated in a substance abuse evaluation, and informed his 
evaluator that he was contemplating suicide. (PSI, p.22.) Mr. Brown's main problem is 
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substance abuse and his substance abuse evaluator recommended that he participate 
in intensive outpatient treatment. (PSI, p.34.) Despite these setbacks, Mr. Brown 
completed high school and has attended some college courses.9 (PSI, pp.7, 9.) 
Finally, Mr. Brown's positive performance while on his rider is also a mitigating 
factor. Mr. Brown's disciplinary summary was positive. (PSI, p.38.) He only had two 
nominal disciplinary issues, for which he accepted full responsibility without minimizing 
his behavior. (PSI, p.38.) Mr. Brown came to New Directions programming prepared 
and had a positive attitude. (PSI, p.38.) He earned an A in his writing skills courses. 
(PSI, p.43.) He also volunteered on various occasions. (PSI, pp.44-45.) The 
Addendum to the Presentence Investigation Report only had laudatory comments about 
his overall performance and he earned a probation recommendation from the IDOC. 
(PSI, pp.38-40.) 
In sum, there are various mitigating factors which support the conclusion that the 
district court abused its discretion when it failed to reduce Mr. Brown's sentence sua 
sponte upon revoking his probation. 
9 For some reason undisclosed in the record, Mr. Brown earned a GED while on his 
rider. (PSI, pp.43-44.) 
33 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Brown respectfully requests that this Court grant review. In the event this 
Court grants review, Mr. Brown respectfully requests access to the requested 
transcripts and the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising 
issues or asserting arguments which arise as a result of that review. In the event this 
request is denied, Mr. Brown requests that the indeterminate portion of his sentence be 
reduced. 
DATED this 19th day of March, 2014. 
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C_../ 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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